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COMMENT 
THE INEQUITABLE TAX BENEFITS OF ADOPTION† 
Nathaniel S. Hibben†† 
ABSTRACT 
This Comment examines the two provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code under which taxpayers may defray expenses incurred in adopting a 
child. First, under Internal Revenue Code § 137, taxpayers may exclude 
from income qualified adoption expenses paid or reimbursed by the 
taxpayer’s employer pursuant to an adoption assistance program. There is 
no benefit gap under the exclusion-from-income provision; the value is 
identical to taxpayers regardless of income.    
Second, under Internal Revenue Code § 23, an adoptive family receives 
a credit against tax liability to help discharge adoption-related expenses. 
Because this credit only discharges positive tax liability, only higher-
income taxpayers are fully benefitted by the credit. Taxpayers without 
sufficient tax liability in the current year may carry forward unused portions 
of the credit for up to five years. However, simple present value analysis 
shows that, by carrying forward unused portions of the credit, these families 
receive less of a benefit than do families with higher income who are able 
to immediately claim the full credit. This benefit gap increases as family 
income decreases. Families without tax liability are not benefitted by the 
adoption credit. The amount of the adoption credit is indexed annually for 
inflation, but this indexation only increases the benefit gap between higher- 
and middle-income taxpayers. This Comment proposes multiple solutions 
to the current inequitable tax benefit paradigm, and it ultimately proposes a 
                                                                                                                           
 † After this Comment was selected for publication, but before it could be printed, 
Congress significantly changed the adoption tax credit. These changes are contained within 
the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Pub. L. No. 111-148, signed into law on 
March 23, 2010. See H.R. 3590 § 10909, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3590enr.txt.pdf. Importantly, because the 
adoption tax credit is now refundable, the economic loss that resulted from carrying unused 
portions of the credit forward will no longer occur. Consequently, much of the analysis 
contained in this Comment is now outdated. Notwithstanding these changes, the Liberty 
University Law Review believes this Comment offers an important contribution and has 
determined that publishing it is appropriate. 
 †† Submissions Editor, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 3; J.D., Liberty 
University School of Law, 2009; B.S. in History, Iowa State University, 2004. Many thanks 
to my wife, Chelsea, for her support. 
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new business tax credit for businesses that provide adoption benefits to 
their employees. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Adoption serves an important social function.1 Appropriately, the federal 
government has implemented pro-adoption policies, particularly within two 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.2 First, § 23 allows an $11,650 tax 
credit to adopting families.3 This credit, as with all tax credits, reduces the 
taxpayer’s tax liability dollar for dollar.4 Second, § 137 permits taxpayers to 
exclude from income monetary adoption benefits provided by the 
taxpayer’s employer.5 An employee may exclude up to $11,650 under this 
section.6 Through these tax benefits, some families are able to discharge the 
significant costs associated with adoption.7 
For a great many other families, however, the Internal Revenue Code’s 
adoption defrayal provisions are inadequate.8 Because the § 23 credit only 
discharges existing tax liability, families need substantial income in order to 
generate sufficient tax liability to utilize the maximum benefit of the credit.9 
In 2008, a family without any other dependents would need to earn at least 
$101,250 to fully utilize the $11,650 adoption tax credit immediately.10 
Approximately 70% of all adoptive families earn less than this threshold 
amount and are unable to fully utilize the adoption tax credit in one year.11 
Indeed, in 2008 an adoptive family that has one other child, yet earns less 
than $56,500, will not fully realize the benefit of the adoption tax credit, 
even when the unused portion of the credit is carried forward for five 
years.12 Approximately one-third of all adoptions are made by families 
earning less than this threshold amount.13 Thus, a third of all adoptive 
families are not able to fully utilize the adoption tax credit, even when 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
 2. See infra Part III.B; see also I.R.C. §§ 23, 137 (2006). 
 3. See infra Part III.  
 4. See infra Part III.B.1.  
 5. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 6. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 7. See infra Part IV.D.2.  
 8. See infra Part IV.A. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. See infra Part IV.D.1.  
 11. See infra Part IV.B-C. 
 12. See infra Part IV.C; Table 1. 
 13. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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carried forward for up to five years.14 Consequently, the credit has the 
effect of fully benefitting higher-income adoptive families while the benefit 
to low-income taxpayers declines significantly as income decreases.15 
Conversely, the value of the exclusion-from-income provision under § 
137 is identical across the income spectrum.16 However, less than half of all 
employers provide adoption benefits to their employees, and practically all 
of the employers that even provide such benefits offer $4,000 or less.17 
Part II of this Comment surveys the history and purpose of adoption, 
including the impact adoption has upon society and adoptive families. Part 
III considers the tax treatment of adoption under current law. Part IV 
explores whether the existing tax treatment of adoption favors higher-
income taxpayers at the expense of lower-income taxpayers. In order to 
resolve this question, this Comment utilizes present value analysis for 
determining the actual benefit of the adoption credit for adoptive families at 
different income levels. Part V analyzes various solutions to the problems 
noted in Part IV. This Comment concludes that the existing tax treatment of 
adoption is inequitable; consequently, a new business tax credit is proposed 
that results in a more equitable distribution of adoption tax benefits across 
the income spectrum.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
Implicit within the argument of this Comment is that adoption should be 
encouraged. Before that argument can be advanced, however, it is 
necessary to understand the role adoption has in society.  
A. Brief History of Adoption 
Adoption had its beginnings in ancient civilization.18 Perhaps the best-
known adoption in history appears in the Book of Exodus, where Moses 
was rescued from the reeds of the Nile and adopted by the Pharaoh’s 
daughter.19 The Code of Hammurabi provided for the institution,20 as did 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See infra Part IV.C. 
 15. See infra Part IV.D.1.  
 16. See infra Table 3.  
 17. See infra Part V.  
 18. CYNTHIA R. MABRY & LISA KELLY, ADOPTION LAW: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE 
1 (2006). 
 19. See Exodus 1:15-22, 2:1-10. Pharaoh issued an edict that all boys were to be thrown 
in the Nile and drowned. Moses’ Hebrew mother refused to kill him, and instead placed him 
near the river bank in a tar and pitch-lined basket, where he was found by the maid of the 
daughter of Pharaoh. Pharaoh’s daughter raised Moses as if he were her biological child.  
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early Roman law, primarily in the form of adults adopting adult males to 
ensure continuation of the adoptive parents’ lineage.21 As a legal category, 
however, classical and Greco-Roman adoption law reflected a sense that 
adoption served the needs of the adoptive parents.22  
Today, the primary consideration in adoption law is the best interests of 
the child,23 which reflects the concept that adoption, above all, is seen as an 
act of love by the one adopting.24 Adoption was not embodied in the 
common law and was not recognized in England until 1926.25 Thus, 
adoption law was not part of the common law the United States carried over 
from England.26 Adoption in America did exist in an unregulated sense, 
                                                                                                                           
 20. Lisa J. Trembly, Untangling the Adoption Web: New Jersey’s Move to Legitimize 
Independent Adoptions, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 376 n.26 (1993).  
 21. Id.; see also MABRY & KELLY, supra note 18, at 1.   
 22. There is an abundance of sources that detail the practice and policy of adoption in 
ancient Greece. See, e.g., LENE RUBINSTEIN, ADOPTION IN IV CENTURY ATHENS 62-76 
(1993); JAMES M. SCOTT, ADOPTION AS SONS OF GOD 3-5 (1992). 
 23. See Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practices, Issues, and Laws 1958-1983, 17 
FAM. L.Q. 173, 175 (1983) (observing that “early U.S. adoption laws used Roman law as a 
guide, with one important and basic difference: Roman law was based upon the needs and 
rights of the adoptive parents; whereas American law, from the beginning, protected the 
welfare of adopted children”). 
 24. See Pollack, Bleich, Reid, & Fadel, Classical Religious Perspectives of Adoption 
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 712-13 (2004). Some scholars trace this loving model of 
adoption directly to the Apostle Paul, who taught that all who are led by the Spirit of God 
are sons of God. Id. at 713; see also Romans 8:14-15. The loving model of adoption finds 
support within biblical text. See, e.g., Romans 8:15 (the relationship between God and the 
individual was created by adoption, and allows God’s children, the followers of Christ, to 
call upon God as “Abba, Father”); James 1:27 (admonishing the believer to “look after 
orphans . . . in their distress”); see also Pollack, supra, at 719 (quoting Aquinas: “Adoption 
depends upon the kindness of the one adopting and the one adopted. God is especially kind 
and the greatest lover of humankind. Therefore God is uniquely competent to adopt.”). To 
the Christian, then, adoption is “the supreme expression of God’s love and grace.” Id. at 713. 
This loving model of adoption, dominant in modern adoption law, finds its roots in the 
foundation of the Christian tradition. Id. 
 25. See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law of 
Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 461-64 (1972); see also E. WAYNE CARP, INTRODUCTION TO 
ADOPTION IN AMERICA 1, 3 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2004). Of course, like the United States, in 
England there were other methods for transfer of custody to persons outside the family – a 
transfer that could be, in effect, irreversible. See, e.g., Danaya Wright, A Crisis of Child 
Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 175, 
183-90 (2002) (describing custody disputes between parents and third parties in the 1700s); 
see also Hall v. Vallandingham, 540 A.2d 1162, 1162 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). 
 26. For instance: 
[In] 1891 the Supreme Court of California held that adoption was “unknown to 
the common law and repugnant to its principles.” As Professor Henry H. Foster 
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however, through the practice of placing children in apprenticeships.27 
Informal adoptions were also created by cultural custom. For instance, 
nineteenth-century parents who were unable to care for their children often 
placed children with other families were who better situated financially to 
care for the children.28 Additionally, as children of enslaved African 
families became separated from their parents, other adults in the community 
took responsibility to care for the parentless children.29 This custom of 
informal adoption by “fictive kin” continues today in some communities.30 
Before enactment of adoption statutes, persons who wanted to create a 
formal, legal relationship with a child could do so through private 
legislative acts.31 This method was displaced by the advent of adoption 
statutes, the first being passed by Massachusetts in 1851.32 Within 25 years, 
                                                                                                                           
has observed, early U.S. adoption laws used Roman law as a guide, with one 
important and basic difference: Roman law was based upon the needs and 
rights of the adoptive parents; whereas American law, from the beginning, 
protected the welfare of adopted children.  
Howe, supra note 23, at 175 (citations omitted) (quoting Ex parte Clark, 87 Cal. 638 
(1891)). For another application, see Hall, 540 A.2d at 1162.  
 27. See MABRY & KELLY, supra note 18, at 2.   
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See Monique Lee Hawthorne, Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the 
Scope of “Family,” 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 809, 826 (2007) (stating that researchers 
have found family-like relations, known as “fictive kin,” commonly exist between non-blood 
individuals in the African American community).  “Fictive kin” is also defined as “[a] term 
used to refer to individuals that are unrelated by either birth or marriage, who have an 
emotionally significant relationship with another individual that would take on the 
characteristics of family relationship.” Id. at 826; see also Adoption Glossary, 
ADOPTION.COM, http://glossary.adoption.com/fictive-kin.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2009). 
Members of Native American and Latino communities also engage in the custom. MABRY & 
KELLY, supra note 18, at 2.  
 31. See Annette R. Appell, The Endurance of Biological Connection: 
Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons of Adoption, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 
289, 297 (2008); see also Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American 
Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 461-60 (1971). Professor Appell notes that, while 
Massachusetts is commonly credited with enacting the first adoption statute in 1851, Texas 
and Mississippi were actually the first states to adopt general adoption statutes. However, 
these earlier statutes merely permitted adopters to make public a private adoption 
arrangement, “analogous to recording a deed for a piece of land.” Appell, supra, at 297 n.50 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 32. Appell, supra note 31, at 297; see also Massachusetts Adoption of Children’s Act of 
1851, 1851 Mass. Acts 816, available at http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/archive/ 
massaca.htm.  
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most states had followed suit.33 These statutes established the hallmark of 
formal adoption: the termination of one family and creation of another.34  
Not coincidentally, the shift toward formal adoption corresponded with 
the transition from an agrarian to an urban economy.35 While remnants of 
the agrarian economy still linger in modern statutes,36 the adoption statutes 
grew out of a notion that children, particularly children born to single 
mothers and families without the means to care for children, should be 
protected.37 This “child saving movement” eventually evolved into the 
present-day child welfare system.38  
While modern adoption law has remained unchanged in core principle, 
the procedure of modern adoption has been significantly modified. Contrary 
to the early days of adoption, modern adoptions are anonymous.39 Court 
records are now usually sealed, and new birth certificates are issued for the 
adoptee.40 Additionally, three distinct types of adoptions exist today: 
independent, private agency, and public agency.41  
B. Social Benefits of Adoption 
There are more than one-and-a-half million adopted children in the 
United States.42 The social benefits of these adoptions are well-documented. 
For instance, every child adopted is less likely to grow up in poverty, more 
likely to obtain an education, and more likely to have a participating father 
than a child raised by an unmarried mother.43 Adopted children generally 
                                                                                                                           
 33. Appell, supra note 31, at 297.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 298. 
 36. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500 (West 2004) (“The mother of an unemancipated 
minor child, and the father, if presumed to be the father under Section 7611, are equally 
entitled to the services and earnings of the child.”). 
 37. Appell, supra note 31, at 298. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult 
Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001).  
 40. Id. at 377. It was not until the 1930s that states began to issue new birth certificates 
that reflected the adoption, and even then, the original certificates remained unsealed for 
decades. Id. at 376.   
 41. This is beyond the scope of this Comment; however, for a good synopsis of the 
three different types of adoption, see Ted R. Youmans, Adoption: An Answer for Children in 
Crisis, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. AD. 71 (2004).   
 42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN 2 (2000), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf. This figure includes only non-
stepchildren under age 18.   
 43. Mary M. Beck, Adoption of Children in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV. 423, 428 (1998); 
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live in wealthier and higher-educated households compared to their 
biological counterparts.44 And adoptive parents benefit from having a child 
to love and nurture.  
Moreover, the government benefits when foster children are adopted. In 
2005, the total federal spending for foster care was $1.8 billion with an 
additional $2.1 billion for administrative expenses.45 According to some 
estimates, adopting a child from foster care saves the government up to 
$6,000 each year.46 Thus, the effects of adoption upon the individual child 
and the economic effects upon the nation are significantly positive. 
III.  TAX TREATMENT UNDER THE CURRENT TAX CODE 
A. Brief History of Adoption Incentives Under the Internal Revenue Code 
The federal government recognizes the impact adoption has on society 
and has implemented a pro-adoption tax policy. Tax incentives for adoption 
were first enacted as part of The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(ERTA), which provided for an itemized deduction for qualified adoption 
expenses incurred in connection with the adoption of a “special needs 
                                                                                                                           
see also Wade F. Horn, Dads Face Sad Statistics, COLUMBUS DAILY TRIB., June 18, 2000, 
available at http://archive.showmenews.com/2000/jun/20000618comm008.asp. 
Children who grow up absent their fathers are five times more likely to be 
poor, two to three times more likely to fail at school and two to three times 
more likely to suffer from an emotional or behavioral problem. As teenagers, 
fatherless children are more likely to commit crime, engage in early and 
promiscuous sexual activity and to commit suicide. 
Id.  
 44. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 42, at 16 (finding that the median annual income 
of adoptive families is $56,138, while biological children live in households with a median 
income of $48,200). See generally In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1198 (Pa. 
2002) (identifying the benefits of adoption as “the legal protection of the children's existing 
familial bonds, their rights; the right to financial support from two parents instead of just 
one, rights; the right to inheritance from two parents; parent and the right to obtain other 
available dependent benefits”). 
 45. CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF PROTECTING 
VULNERABLE CHILDREN V: UNDERSTANDING STATE VARIATION IN CHILD WELFARE 
FINANCING 15 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311314_ 
vulnerable_children.pdf. 
 46. See Ian Urbina, Trying to Keep Child Care in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2006, § 1, at 16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/23/us/23guardian.html?_ 
r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all; see also 42 U.S.C. § 672 (2006) (statutory requirements 
of foster care payments).   
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child.”47 This deduction was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.48 
Congress reconsidered its position and included in the conference report to 
the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 a call for a tax 
deduction “to encourage and facilitate adoption” but stopped short of 
actually implementing the deduction.49 Tax credit and exclusion provisions 
for adoption were enacted by Congress as part of the Seven-Year Balanced 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995; that legislation, however, was vetoed 
by President Clinton.50 The veto was apparently due to other considerations; 
one year later, President Clinton directed an Executive Memorandum to the 
Department of Health and Human Services recommending strategies to 
double the number of American adoptions.51 Following the veto, the 
Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996 was introduced.52 This bill 
was rolled into and made a part of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 
1996, which authorized a tax credit and an income exclusion provision to 
help ease the burdens of adoptions for many taxpayers.53 In 2001, Congress 
and President Bush re-authorized and increased the tax benefits of 
adoption,54 as well as provided for annual indexation of the credit and 
                                                                                                                           
 47. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 125 (repealed 1986); see also Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 § 222 (amended 1986).  
 48. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ADOPTION TAX CREDIT AND EXCLUSION 3 (Aug. 23, 
1996), available at http://pennyhill.com/index.php?lastcat=27&catname=Families&viewdoc 
=96-692.  
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. See Memorandum on Adoption and Alternate Permanent Placement of Children in 
the Public Child Welfare System, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2209 (Dec. 14, 1996); see also DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., ADOPTION 2002: A RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE 
MEMORANDUM ON ADOPTION (2002), available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/ 
initiatives/adopt2002/2002toc.htm. In 1997, over 500,000 children lived in foster care, but 
no more than 27,000 were adopted. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVES 25 (1999). 
Bartholet concludes that the states’ family preservation services probably impede adoption 
of foster children. Id. at 25-26. However, adoptions out of foster care did nearly double 
between 1996 and 2000. Evan B. Donaldson, Adoption Inst., Foster Care Facts, available at 
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/foster.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2008) 
(noting a 78% increase in adoptions from foster care between 1996 and 2000). 
 52. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 4.   
 53. Id. 
 54. See Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRAA), Pub. L. No. 
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of Title 26 of the United States Code). 
For a discussion of the tax benefits, see infra Part III.B.  
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exclusion amounts.55 Since then, facilitating and supporting adoptions has 
enjoyed bipartisan support.56  
B. The Tax Treatment of Qualified Adoption Expenses Incurred by the 
Taxpayer 
Currently, the Internal Revenue Code provides two mechanisms to help 
defray the costs of adopting a child.  
 1. The Adoption Tax Credit 
First, § 23 allows a tax credit to adopting parents to help discharge 
“qualified adoption expenses” (QAE), which include reasonable and 
necessary adoption fees, court costs, attorney fees, the birth mother’s 
reasonable living expenses, and other costs directly related to adopting an 
“eligible child.”57 A child is eligible if he is under age eighteen or is 
incapable of caring for himself.58 In 2008, the maximum adoption credit 
was $11,650,59 which meant that an adoptive family could offset adoption 
expenses up to the credit amount against income tax liability. The adoption 
credit amount is adjusted annually for inflation.60 The credit reduces the 
taxpayer’s tax liability dollar for dollar but does not result in a negative tax 
liability.61 Expenses that are otherwise reimbursed to the adoptive parents, 
such as through an adoption assistance program,62 do not qualify, nor do 
                                                                                                                           
 55. See infra Part IV.D.2.  
 56. See, e.g., Democratic Party 2008 Platform, Renewing America’s Promise, 
DEMOCRATS.ORG, http://www.democrats.org/a/party/platform.html (last visited Oct. 31, 
2008) (“The Democratic Party also strongly supports a woman’s decision to have a child by 
ensuring access to and availability of . . . caring adoption programs;” and “We must protect 
our most vulnerable children, by . . . enhancing adoption programs”).  The 2008 Republican 
Party Platform did not contain any statement supporting adoption. See GOP.COM, 
http://platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf. However, President Bush (R) signed into law the 
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Public Law No. 
110-351, which promotes adoption of special needs children and requires adoption agencies 
to inform prospective adoptive parents of adoption tax benefits. For information and text of 
the Bill, see http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_ 
laws&docid=f:publ351.110.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009). 
 57. I.R.C. § 23(a)(1), (d)(1) (2006). 
 58. I.R.C. § 23(d)(2). 
 59. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, ADOPTION BENEFITS INCREASED (Mar. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/article/0,,id=177982,00.html. 
 60. See infra note 69.  
 61. In other words, the adoption credit is not refundable. See infra Part V.A.   
 62. See infra Part III.B.2.   
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any expenses connected with step-parent adoptions63 or surrogate parenting 
arrangements.64 If the § 23 credit exceeds the parents’ tax liability for the 
year in which the credit is taken, the parents may carry forward the unused 
portion of the credit for up to five years.65 
The following example illustrates the tax benefits of the § 23 adoption 
credit.  
In 2008, Paul and Mary adopted a child. They incurred QAE of 
$10,000. Assume their gross income for the year is $70,000, and 
their marginal tax rate is 25%. Thus, their federal income tax 
liability is $17,500. They can claim a credit of $10,000 (the 
credit is limited to QAE) under § 23, which reduces their tax 
liability to $7,500. Through the adoption tax credit, their net 
adoption costs have been reduced to zero.  
 2. The Tax Treatment of Employer-Provided Adoption Monetary 
Benefits 
The second mechanism through which adoptive families may defray 
expenses is found in § 137, which permits taxpayers to exclude from 
income QAE paid or reimbursed by the taxpayer’s employer pursuant to an 
“adoption assistance program.”66 An adoption assistance program must be a 
separate, written plan and must not discriminate in favor of “highly 
compensated employees.”67 Although amounts paid by the employer under 
a qualified assistance program are excludable from the employee’s income 
for income tax purposes, the amounts are subject to FICA taxes, and the 
employer must withhold the appropriate amount of FICA tax.68 Sections 23 
and 137 contain identical language providing that the relevant amount of 
credit or exclusion is adjusted annually for inflation, as set by I.R.C. § 
1(f)(3).69 Consequently, the exclusion amount under § 137 will always be 
identical to the maximum credit under § 23. In 2008, the maximum 
                                                                                                                           
 63. I.R.C. § 23(d)(1)(C).  
 64. I.R.C. § 23(d)(1)(B).  
 65. I.R.C. § 23(c).  
 66. I.R.C. § 137. 
 67. I.R.C. § 137(c). All employee benefit programs must not favor highly compensated 
employees. See I.R.C. § 127(b)(2), (3), (5), (6). 
 68. I.R.S. Notice 97-9, 1997-2 I.R.B. 35.  
 69. See I.R.C. §§ 23(h), 137(f). 
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exclusion under § 137 was $11,650.70 Both § 23 and § 137 can apply to a 
single adoption, but cannot apply to the same adoption expenses.71  
The § 137 exclusion is demonstrated by the following example:  
In 2008, Tom and Sally adopted a child. They incurred QAE of 
$16,000. Assume their gross income for the year is $50,000, and 
their marginal tax rate is 25%. Thus, their federal income tax 
liability is $12,500. They can claim the full § 23 credit of 
$11,650, which reduces their tax liability to $850 and leaves 
Tom and Sally with $4,350 in remaining QAE ($16,000 – 
$11,650). However, also assume Sally’s employer provides up to 
$5,000 under the employer’s adoption assistance program. Thus, 
Tom and Sally receive $4,350 from the employer and under § 
137 are able to exclude the sum from income. Their net adoption 
costs have been reduced to zero, and the amount received under 
the adoption assistance program has not impacted the couple’s 
tax liability.72  
The § 23 credit and § 137 exclusion are phased out if the parents have 
gross income between $174,730 and $214,730.73 Parents with gross income 
of $214,730 or more cannot qualify for either the credit or the exclusion.74  
Expenses incurred for adoptions of U.S. citizens can qualify for the 
credit even if the adoption is not finalized.75 However, if the adoptive child 
is not a U.S. citizen, a taxpayer can take neither the credit nor the exclusion 
unless the adoption is finalized.76  
                                                                                                                           
 70. See supra note 59.   
 71. See I.R.C. § 23 (b)(3)(A); see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
ON TAX BENEFITS FOR ADOPTION 1 (2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/adoption.pdf. 
 72. Notice there is no connection between QAE and tax liability; even if the former 
exceeds the latter, the taxpayer may nonetheless avail himself of the § 137 credit.  Similarly, 
notice the credit affects tax liability while the exclusion does not. 
 73. See I.R.S. Notice 97-9, supra note 68.   
 74. See id. 
 75. See id.; see also I.R.S. Publication 968 at 3, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/ 
pub/irs-prior/p968--2004.pdf.  
 76. I.R.S. Notice 97-9, supra note 68; see also I.R.C. § 23(e)(1); I.R.S. Publication 968, 
supra note 75, at 4.  
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IV.  THE EXISTING TAX TREATMENT OF ADOPTION FAVORS HIGHER-
INCOME TAXPAYERS 
A. Outlining the Problem 
Adoption raises important policy questions, including how to promote 
the child’s interests, how to protect fragile birth families, and how to place 
the child with a permanent family. Important policy questions must also be 
addressed when providing tax benefits for adoption. Most importantly, 
policy makers must determine how to allocate scarce resources among 
adoptive families. However, which income group to prefer when it comes 
to awarding tax benefits is not a legitimate policy issue. Quite simply, there 
is no legitimate reason to favor higher-income adoptive families over 
middle- or lower-income adoptive families. Yet the existing tax benefit 
structure does just that. Consider two problems with the existing tax 
incentives for adoption. First, middle-income taxpayers do not receive the 
same real economic benefit under the adoption tax credit as higher-income 
taxpayers, despite the fact that middle-income taxpayers undertake 
approximately 70% of all non-step-child adoptions.77 Second, the existing 
tax incentive structure is such that the truly equitable adoption tax benefit, 
the § 137 exclusion-from-income provision, is underutilized. The exclusion 
is inherently more equitable than the credit because it has the same value to 
all taxpayers, regardless of their income.78 
B. The Normative Starting Point 
Adoptions can be expensive. Public agency adoptions79 are generally the 
cheapest, with costs varying from $0 to $2,500. The cost of private agency 
adoptions can exceed $30,000, while independent adoptions range from 
$8,000 to more than $30,000.80 Anecdotal evidence suggests independent 
adoption costs can exceed $40,000.81 As for foreign adoptions, “adoptive 
parents can expect to pay $18,000–$35,000 to adopt a child from China, 
Korea, Russia, or Guatemala.”82 Major banks recognize that the costs of 
                                                                                                                           
 77. See infra Part IV.C.  
 78. See infra Table 3.  
 79. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 80. See NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., COSTS OF ADOPTING 1-3, available at http://adoptiveparents.org/Reprinted_Articles/ 
adoption_gip_two.pdf.  
 81. Id.  
 82. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoption, 39 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1441 (2006).   
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adoption exceed the tax benefits, and accordingly market adoption loans 
specifically to adoptive parents.83    
There were 84,793 income tax returns that claimed the adoption credit in 
2005, the last year for which complete data is available.84 Approximately 
70%, or 55,000, taxpayers claimed the adoption credit had insufficient tax 
liability to fully offset current-year adoption expenditures.85 These 
taxpayers must carry forward unused portions of the credit.86 The result is 
that taxpayers who must carry forward unused portions of the credit receive 
less of a benefit than do taxpayers who have sufficient tax liability to 
immediately utilize the credit.87 This is because QAE is incurred and paid 
immediately, while the tax benefit is not realized until years later. 
Accordingly, present value analysis reveals the relationship between 
income tax liability and real value of the adoption credit: the lower the 
taxpayer’s tax liability, the less the credit is worth.88  
C. The Distribution of Adoption Tax Benefits Across the Income Spectrum 
Whereas the adoption tax credit is inequitable across the income 
spectrum, the real benefit of the § 137 exclusion-from-income provision is 
identical regardless of income.89  
In 2008, the adoption tax benefit structure resulted in unequal 
distribution across four distinct tiers of income.90 Tier One is the wealthiest 
tier. This Tier encompasses taxpayers with incomes of $174,730 and above. 
These households are ineligible or partially ineligible for adoption benefits 
because their income level is too high.91 The amount of adoption credit for 
which this Tier is eligible decreases as income increases. Tier Two is the 
                                                                                                                           
 83. Many major banks provide adoption loans. For a collection of adoption financing 
options, see Adoption.com, Adoption Loans, http://www.adoptionloans.com; 
http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/Adoption-Resources/Adoption-
Links#CMSNestedLinks_Id4 (follow the “financial assistance” link). 
 84. See infra Table 5.2; see also I.R.S. 2005 STATISTICS OF INCOME, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=133414,00.html (click on “2005” under 
Table 2).  
 85. See infra Tables 4, 6.  
 86. See supra Part III.B.  
 87. See infra Part IV.C.  
 88. See infra Part IV.C.  
 89. See infra Table 3.  
 90. The Tier structure assumes no other dependents. See infra Tables 2, 5.  
 91. That is, their income exceeds the phase-out amount. For 2005 Tier One information, 
see Table 6. For 2008 Tier One information, see Table 2.  
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second wealthiest Tier.92 Income in this Tier is between $101,250 and 
$174,730. This is the only group to fully benefit from the adoption tax 
credit. Tier Three is the next wealthiest Tier.93 Tier Three income is 
between $46,200 and $101,249. This group only partially benefits from the 
adoption credit. As income decreases, the amount of adoption credit for 
which this Tier is eligible decreases. Approximately two-thirds of adoptions 
are undertaken by families within this Tier.94 Tier Four is the least wealthy 
Tier.95 The income of a household in this group is $46,199 and below. This 
Tier is not able to utilize the adoption credit, even when carried forward for 
five years. Moreover, some households in this tier are completely ineligible 
to recieve adoption tax credit benefits.96  
D. General Principles of Tax Credits 
Tax credits can be understood by recognizing three principles. First, a 
tax credit only discharges existing income tax liability.97 Second, income 
tax liability is a product of income; a household without sufficient income 
will not generate tax liability and is ineligible to claim a tax credit.98 Third, 
as the amount of the tax credit increases, so does the amount of income that 
is required to generate sufficient tax liability to fully utilize the credit.99  
 1. Applying the Principles to the Adoption Tax Credit 
Families need substantial income in order to use the benefits from the 
maximum possible adoption tax credit. In 2008, only a household with an 
income greater than $101,250 would have sufficient tax liability to fully 
utilize the $11,650 adoption credit in one year, assuming no other 
dependents.100 The amount of necessary income increases to $113,550 if the 
                                                                                                                           
 92. For 2005 Tier Two information, see Table 6. For 2008 Tier Two information, see 
Table 2. 
 93. For 2005 Tier Three information, see Table 6. For 2008 Tier Three information, see 
Table 2. 
 94. See infra Tables 5.2, 6.  
 95. For 2005 Tier Four information, see Table 6. For 2008 Tier Four information, see 
Table 2. 
 96. See infra Tables 2, 5. 
 97. See infra note 150 for more information on refundable tax credits. Most credits are 
not refundable. “Refundable” tax credits, such as the EITC, are an exception to this general 
rule.  
 98. See generally Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549 (2008). 
 99. Id.  
 100. See infra Table 1.  
2009] INEQUITABLE TAX BENEFITS OF ADOPTION 149 
 
 
taxpayer has one other child and claims two child care credits.101 Thus, only 
households earning between $101,250 and the phase-out amount, which in 
2008 was $174,730, are eligible to utilize the maximum benefit of the 
adoption credit. In other words, for an adoptive family with income in that 
range, the value of the adoption credit is its maximum: $11,650.  
However, the real value of the adoption credit for a household with a 
2008 income of $101,250 or below is less than $11,650. This is because 
taxpayers earning less than $101,250 will not generate sufficient income tax 
liability to immediately utilize the credit and instead must carry forward 
unused portions. Present value analysis reveals the resulting inequity: the 
lower the taxpayer’s tax liability, the less the credit is worth.102 Because tax 
liability is a product of income, the current structure of the adoption tax 
credit strongly favors higher-income taxpayers relative to middle- and 
lower-income taxpayers. Thus, lower-income adopting households are at a 
significant economic disadvantage relative to their higher-income 
counterparts. 
Consider two hypothetical adopting households, each without any other 
dependents. In 2008, Family One adopts a child, earns $72,150 in income, 
and incurs QAE of $11,650.103 Family One will have $5,825 of eligible tax 
liability,104 which must be offset by the adoption credit immediately. The 
unused portion of the adoption credit is $5,825, which may be carried 
forward and used as a credit on next year’s tax liability.105 However, by 
incurring the expenses immediately but not recouping those expenses until 
next year, Family One suffers an economic loss because it is not presently 
able to recover the expenses of the adoption. Assuming a 6% interest rate, 
Family One has suffered an economic loss of $349.50.106 The actual 
economic benefit of the adoption credit is reduced accordingly. Thus, the 
actual economic benefit of the adoption credit to Family One is 
$11,300.50.107  
Family Two adopts a child in 2008, earns $46,200 in income, and incurs 
QAE of $11,650.108 Family Two will have $1,941.67 of eligible tax 
                                                                                                                           
 101. See infra Table 1. 
 102. For full analysis of the inequity, see infra Table 2 (2008 data) and Table 6 (2005 
data).  
 103. See infra Table 2. 
 104. See infra Table 2.  
 105. See infra Table 2. 
 106. See infra Table 2. 
 107. See infra Table 2.  
 108. See infra Table 2.  
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liability,109 which must be offset by the adoption credit immediately. The 
unused portion of the adoption credit is $9,708.35, which may be carried 
forward and used as a credit on next year’s tax liability.110 If next year’s tax 
liability is not sufficient to fully utilize the unused portion of the credit, the 
unused portion will be carried forward to the next year. This will continue 
until the credit is fully utilized or Year 5 occurs, whichever is first.111 Each 
time the credit is carried forward, Family Two suffers an economic loss 
because it is not presently able to recover the adoption expenses already 
paid.112 Assuming both a 6% interest rate and that the credit is not fully 
utilized until Year 5, Family Two will have suffered an economic loss of 
$1,747.50,113 which reduces the actual economic benefit of the adoption 
credit to $9,902.50.114 If Family Two utilized loans to pay for the adoption, 
the value of the credit would be reduced according to the interest rate. 
An adoptive family earning between $35,242115 and $46,199 in 2008 will 
not generate sufficient tax liability to utilize the credit over a five-year 
period.116 Thus, the value of the credit to such a family is significantly 
diminished, even as compared to Family Two above. The value of the 
adoption credit is $0 to a family earning $35,241 or less, because such a 
family will not have sufficient income to generate any tax liability.117 This 
means that approximately 43.4 million American households, or one-third 
of all households in the United States, are completely ineligible for the 
adoption credit benefits.118 
                                                                                                                           
 109. See infra Table 2 for more information on the term “eligible” tax liability. 
 110. See infra Table 2. 
 111. See supra Part III.B.   
 112. See supra Part III.B. 
 113. See supra Part III.B.  
 114. See supra Part III.B.  
 115. This is the EITC limit for 2008. Under the assumptions of this analysis, households 
with income below this level will not have 2008 tax liability. See INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 2008, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=178069,00.html.  
 116. See infra Table 2.  
 117. The income amount would be much higher if the family had other children, or was 
eligible for other credits.  
 118. In 2006, 43.4 million households had no tax liability. See TAX FOUNDATION, FISCAL 
FACTS, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/show/1410.html. This percentage 
was an all-time high and has been growing since 1981. This number is actually higher; when 
people who do not earn enough to report income are counted, about 40% of all wage earners 
have no income tax liability. Moreover, according to one study, if President Obama’s 
campaign tax plan is implemented, that figure will increase to close to 63 million (Senator 
McCain’s plan would have been 62 million). Id.   
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This inequity might be more palatable if adoptions were only undertaken 
by those earning sufficient income to immediately utilize the full adoption 
credit.119 It is true that adoptive households are generally wealthier than 
their biological counterparts.120 It is inapposite, however, to measure the 
inequity of the adoption tax credit by comparing its benefit to biological 
parents. Instead, the equity of the adoption tax credit can be measured only 
by comparing its benefit among adoptive parents at different income 
levels.121 
Moreover, the data shows that even taxpayers with above-average 
income do not receive the full benefit of the adoption tax credit.122 In 2005, 
the national median family income was $46,326.123 But even a family 
earning $90,000, or nearly twice the median, cannot utilize the full benefit 
of the adoption tax credit.124 In total, approximately 70% of taxpayers 
claiming the adoption credit did not have sufficient income—hence 
sufficient tax liability—to fully offset current-year adoption expenditures in 
2005.125 Thus, present value analysis reveals that the adoption tax credit is 
worth less than the statutory maximum for 70% of those claiming its 
benefit.126   
                                                                                                                           
 119. The myth that only wealthy individuals adopt has been reinforced by popular 
culture; the recent movie Juno, for instance, is the story of a teenage girl from a blue-collar 
family who becomes pregnant and an upper middle class, suburban couple who want to 
adopt the child. JUNO (Fox Searchlight 2007).  
 120. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN 
(2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-6.pdf. The study found that 
an adoptive family’s median income is $56,138, while biological children live in households 
with a median income of $48,200. Id.  
 121. Additionally, Congress has decided that the Tax Code should favor adoptive parents 
over biological parents. See generally infra Part III.A.  
 122. The national median income in 2005 was $46,326. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See infra Table 6.  
 125. In 2005, the threshold amount was $92,800; any taxpayer earning less than this 
amount would have insufficient income tax liability to fully utilize the adoption tax credit 
immediately. See infra Table 6. Approximately 70% of taxpayers claiming the adoption 
credit earned less than this amount. See infra Table 4. This figure was calculated by dividing 
60,000, the approximate number of taxpayers earning less than $92,800 who claimed the 
credit, by 85,000, the approximate total number of taxpayers who claimed the adoption 
credit, and rounding to the nearest five or zero in order to avoid the appearance of undue 
precision.  
 126. See generally infra Tables 2, 6.  
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In 2005, the adoption credit was worth approximately $600 less to a 
household earning $54,000 than the same credit was worth to a family 
earning $100,000.127 One-third of taxpayers claiming the adoption credit in 
2005 earned $54,000 or less.128 Additionally, 15% of taxpayers who 
claimed the adoption credit in 2005 earned insufficient income to fully 
utilize the adoption credit even when carrying forward unused portions for 
five years.129 Only 30% of taxpayers claiming the adoption credit in 2005 
were able to fully utilize the credit immediately, or were above the phase-
out amount.130  
 2. Annual Indexation of the Adoption Credit 
As the above analysis shows, the current structure of the adoption tax 
credit has resulted in a significant benefit gap between higher- and lower-
income taxpayers. Moreover, this benefit gap grows every year because the 
adoption tax credit is indexed annually for inflation.131 This is because 
families with substantial tax liability will be able to claim a credit for a 
greater amount of adoption expenses while lower-income taxpayers are not 
fully benefited, if at all.132 
Annual indexation has led to other inequities. Since Congress instituted 
annual indexation of the adoption tax credit in 2001, the total percentage of 
claimed adoption credits that were disqualified has increased every year.133 
In 2002, the first year after the credit was increased from $5,000 to 
$10,000, 46% of the amount claimed in adoption credit was disqualified 
because it was claimed by taxpayers without tax liability.134 In 2003, 51% 
of claimed amounts were disqualified,135 while 53% were disqualified in 
2004.136 By 2005, 61% of the total amount of claimed adoption credits was 
disqualified due to insufficient tax liability.137 Thus, in 2005, 61% of the 
total amount claimed in adoption credit had to be carried forward into 
                                                                                                                           
 127. See infra Tables 6.1, 6.3. 
 128. See infra Table 4.  
 129. See infra Table 4. This figure was arrived at by dividing 14,000, the approximate 
number of taxpayers who claimed the credit earning less than $43,099, by 85,000, the 
approximate total number of taxpayers who claimed the adoption credit, and rounding to the 
nearest five or zero in order to avoid the appearance of undue precision.  
 130. See infra Tables 4, 6.  
 131. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 132. See supra Part IV.D.1.   
 133. See infra Table 5.2.  
 134. See infra Table 5.2. 
 135. See infra Table 5.2. 
 136. See infra Table 5.2. 
 137. See infra Table 5.2.  
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future years, and 61% of adoption expenses already incurred could not be 
presently recouped.  
As the credit increased due to annual indexation, so did the amount of 
disqualified claimed credit.138 The credits were disqualified only because 
the taxpayer did not have sufficient income tax liability to utilize the 
credit.139 The net effect is that the benefit gap—the amount of tax benefit 
received by higher-income adoptive families relative to lower-income 
adoptive families—grows every year. Adoptive families with sufficient 
income to generate tax liability were able to claim the credit and offset 
adoption expenses, while a lower-income adoptive family, or a family with 
declining income, received less benefit, even though that family still 
incurred the adoption expense. Thus, Congress was not being charitable 
when it instituted annual indexation, but instead inequitable.  
This is predictable, though perhaps counterintuitive. First, annual 
indexation disproportionately benefits taxpayers with substantial income.140 
But as is shown above, a majority of those claiming the adoption credit earn 
too little to fully utilize the credit immediately.141 Second, annual 
indexation is harmful in the case of an adoptive family without significant 
tax liability, or where the annual percentage increase in income is less than 
the percentage of annual indexation. Indeed, to be benefitted by the annual 
indexation, a taxpayer also must have a yearly increase in tax liability at 
least equal to the increase in the credit amount. In other words, in order for 
the annual credit increase to benefit any taxpayer, the product of the 
taxpayer’s income tax rate (R) and difference between the taxpayer’s 
current-year income (I2) and previous-year income (I1) must be greater than 
the amount of the adoption credit increase (Cincrease). Thus, only if 
(I2 – I1) x R > Cincrease 
is the taxpayer benefitted by the annual indexation. 
Indexation has also resulted in an inverse relationship between claimed 
credits and allowed credit: as the total number of adoption credit claims 
increased, the actual dollar amount allowed as a credit decreased.142 The 
number of taxpayers who claim the adoption credit has increased every year 
                                                                                                                           
 138. See infra Table 5.1.  
 139. See infra Table 5.2. For a definition of “nontaxable return,” and an explanation on 
why the claimed amounts were disqualified, see I.R.S. Explanation of Terms, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06insec4.pdf.  
 140. See supra Part IV.D.1.  
 141. See supra Part IV.D.2.    
 142. See infra Table 5.1.  
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since 2001, as has the total amount of claimed credit.143 In 2005, for 
instance, the total number of returns claiming the adoption credit increased 
by 17% as compared to 2004. However, the total amount of allowed credit 
peaked in 2003 and has decreased every year since.144 As compared to 
2003, there was a 25% increase in the total number of adoption credit 
claims. But the total dollar amount of allowed credit was 27% lower in 
2005 than at its peak in 2003, even though the amount claimed had 
increased by 9% in the same time span.145 More dollars in credit were 
claimed in 2005 than in any previous year.146 But 2005 was also a record 
year for the percentage of amount claimed on non-taxable returns, and 
consequently not allowed in the present year.147 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this data. First, as the credit 
increased due to annual indexation, so did the amount of disqualified 
claimed credit. Second, as the total number of adoption credit claims 
increased, the actual dollar amount allowed as a credit decreased. The result 
is that the actual dollar amount of tax benefit received by a taxpayer 
depends upon the total income of the taxpayer: the more income, the more 
tax benefit for adopting. Taxpayers with less income receive less tax 
benefit. 
V.  EXPLORING SOME SOLUTIONS 
As the above analysis shows, the fundamental problem of the adoption 
credit is that it is inequitable. In real dollars, the credit benefits higher-
income taxpayers more than it does lower- and middle-income taxpayers.148 
Simply raising the credit amount does not solve the problem; indeed, 
raising the allowable credit exacerbates the dilemma.149 Instead, the very 
structure of the credit must be addressed.  
A. Solution #1: Make the Credit Refundable 
Perhaps the most obvious solution is to make the adoption credit 
“refundable” against tax, meaning that the excess of the credit value over 
                                                                                                                           
 143. See infra Table 5.2. 
 144. See infra Table 5.2.  
 145. See infra Table 5.2. 
 146. See infra Table 5.2.  
 147. See infra Table 5.2.  
 148. See supra Part IV.D.1.  
 149. See supra Part IV.D.2.  
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tax liability is actually paid by the government directly to the taxpayer.150 In 
general, refundable tax credits are used today only when the “government 
wishes to allocate money to achieve a fundamental societal objective.”151 
This is certainly true with the adoption tax credit. The major refundable tax 
credits in existence today are the earned income tax credit (EITC), the child 
care credit, and a small health insurance credit.152 The use of refundable tax 
credits has increased dramatically since 1986,153 in part because, as some 
argue, refundable credits are the most efficient manner of equally 
distributing tax incentives to all taxpayers.154  
A refundable adoption tax credit makes sense from an equity standpoint 
because a credit would apply the same marginal incentive to all taxpayers 
regardless of rate bracket or filing status. Accordingly, taxpayers who incur 
adoption expenses would be able to immediately recoup those expenses, 
regardless of income level.155  
Refundable tax credits are not without critics, however, who often claim 
that refundable credits are undesirable as essentially equivalent to a welfare 
system administered through the Internal Revenue Code.156 In particular, 
the EITC has been subject to criticism due to the large amount and 
frequency of overpayments to taxpayers.157 A refundable adoption tax credit 
                                                                                                                           
 150. A “refundable” credit is so called because the excess of the credit is receivable by 
the taxpayer after the credit has offset existing income tax liability. See Lily Batchelder, Fred 
Goldberg, & Peter Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 27 (2006) (arguing that “refundable credits are the most 
efficient default form [of credits]”). For a definition of the “Earned Income Credit,” see 
I.R.S. Explanation of Terms, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06insec4.pdf. 
 151. Lisa Milot, The Case Against Tax Incentives for Organ Transfers, 45 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 67, 79 (2008). 
 152. I.R.C. §§ 32, 35, 45F (2006) (respectively).  
 153. See generally Milot, supra note 151, at 78. 
 154. See generally Batchelder et al., supra note 150.  
 155. For instance, a taxpayer with QAE of $7,000 but no tax liability would receive a 
“refund” of $7,000, thus reducing QAE to zero. 
 156. See, e.g., Press Release, Republican Study Comm., House Conservatives: “Tax 
Code Should Not Be The Place For Welfare,” Urge Changes in EITC & Refundable Child 
Tax Credit (June 11, 2003), available at http://johnshadegg.house.gov/RSC/PR61103.pdf 
(quoting Representative Sue Myrick as stating that “[t]he debate over the ‘refundable child 
tax credit’ isn’t a debate about a tax issue; it’s a welfare issue”).  
 157. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Welfare: The Mother of All Tax Credits, 2 HOOVER DIG., 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3042856.html (stating that EITC 
errors resulted in $8.5 to $9.9 billion in overpayments for the 1999 tax year and that there 
was a 30% error rate); Robert Greenstein, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, The New 
Procedures for the Earned Income Tax Credit 5 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-
20-03eitc2.pdf (stating that, as a result of new Service procedures initiated in 2003, “the 
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would also lead to a loss of government revenue. Based on these critiques, 
skeptics of refundable credits in general may be hostile to a refundable 
adoption credit.  
B. Solution #2: Decrease the Credit and Increase the Exclusion Amount 
Another potential solution to the adoption credit’s equity problem is to 
decrease the amount of available adoption credit, and to increase the 
amount of adoption assistance excluded from income under § 137. The 
credit already seems too high because the percentage of claimed credits that 
were disqualified due to the taxpayer filing a non-taxable return is 
increasing every year.158 Quite simply, taxpayers do not have enough tax 
liability as it is to fully utilize the credit; decreasing the credit, however, 
would allow taxpayers at the lower- or middle-income ranges to realize the 
same benefit as higher-income earners. With a carefully chosen credit 
amount,159 the government could maximize the number of taxpayers who 
receive roughly the same benefit. Under such a schema, even families with 
marginal positive tax liability would receive the identical tax benefit as a 
higher-income household. If the adoptive family’s employer provided 
monetary adoption benefits, the § 137 exclusion could cover the gap to the 
extent that adoption expenses exceeded the available credit. Because the 
value of the exclusion is identical across the income spectrum,160 decreasing 
the credit and relying more on the exclusion results in a more equitable 
benefit distribution paradigm.  
This solution presents some significant problems of its own. First, this 
solution is really a compromise of decreasing the benefit for adoptions, 
even though expenses often exceed $5,000, for greater equity among all 
taxpayers. Second, an adoptive family is not benefited even by a decreased 
credit amount unless their tax liability exceeds the credit amount. Even a 
carefully chosen credit amount, as advocated above, will not result in equal 
distribution of the benefit in the case of a household without tax liability.161  
                                                                                                                           
rates at which EITC filers will be subject either to audit or to other documentation 
requirements and verification procedures will be sharply higher than the rates at which other 
filers are subject to scrutiny”). 
 158. See infra Table 5.2; see also supra Part IV.C. 
 159. The author offers $5,000 as a prudent amount for the adoption credit. 
 160. See infra Table 3.  
 161. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the number of 
American households that are either outside of the income tax system or within it solely to 
collect refunds. Because these households do not have income tax liability, they receive no 
benefit from the adoption credit.  
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Third, the most recent statistics indicate that only about 40% of 
employers offer adoption assistance benefits to their employees.162 Of the 
employers that do provide adoption assistance benefits, the average amount 
of maximum reimbursement offered to employees is approximately 
$4,000,163 or roughly one-third of the amount the taxpayer could receive 
tax-free from the employer.164 Thus, the structure of the exclusion is 
equitable in principle, but its application by private employers is anything 
but equitable. Under the current system, the only incentives employers 
receive for offering adoption benefits are goodwill and, for profitable 
private businesses, a business tax deduction.165  
The data also suggest that the current exclusion, $11,650 in 2008, is too 
low.166 In 2005, the § 137 exclusion accounted for only 1.7% of all allowed 
adoption tax benefits.167 The remainder of allowed adoption tax benefits 
were allowed under the § 23 credit.168 The percentage of allowed exclusion 
benefits as compared to all allowed benefits has decreased every year since 
indexation began in 2001.169 This fact, coupled with the increase in credits 
claimed on non-taxable returns,170 suggests that taxpayers who rely on the 
credit despite their lack of tax liability do so because their employer does 
not provide adoption benefits. Increasing the exclusion amount would 
provide a greater incentive for employers to offer adoption benefits to their 
employees because the employee would be able to exclude the amount from 
income and the business would receive a larger deduction. Because the 
structure of the exclusion is more equitable than the credit, increased 
reliance on the exclusion, which is a foreseeable consequence of providing 
greater incentives for the employer to provide benefits, results in a more 
equitable distribution of adoption tax benefits.171 
                                                                                                                           
 162. See Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption, Adoption-Friendly Workplace: 
Employer Toolkit, http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/Adoption-Resources/ Free-
Materials/Adoption-Benefits. For data from past years, see Child Welfare Information 
Gateway, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_benefi.cfm.  
 163. Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 162. 
 164. See supra Part III.B.  
 165. I.R.C. § 162 (2006). 
 166. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 59.  
 167. See infra Table 5.1.  
 168. See infra Table 5.1; see also I.R.C. § 23 (allowing deduction for adoption expenses 
not covered by employer).  
 169. See infra Table 5.1. 
 170. See supra Part IV.C.  
 171. Some companies already provide adoption benefits to their employees in excess of 
the allowed exclusion amount. See Dave Thomas Foundation, Top 100 Best Adoption-
Friendly Workplaces, http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/Our-Work/Adoption-Friendly-
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C. Solution #3: Turn the Exclusion into a Credit for Businesses That 
Provide Adoption Benefits 
How then can the government increase the rate at which employers offer 
adoption benefits to their employees? As the above has shown, the 
exclusion is theoretically more equitable than the adoption credit.172 But 
this is only true in practice if more employers provide adoption benefits to 
their employees.173 One such method of increasing employer participation 
is to increase the exclusion amount.174 Another is for employees to request 
that their employers provide adoption benefits.175 
Perhaps the most novel method of increasing employer participation is to 
create a new tax credit for businesses that provide adoption assistance to 
their employees. Providing businesses with a tax credit instead of a 
deduction would directly result in a more equitable distribution of adoption 
benefits across the income spectrum. Contrary to the existing adoption 
credit, the value of the exclusion is identical regardless of the employee’s 
income level. Creating a new tax credit for businesses that provide adoption 
benefits would encourage more employers to offer adoption benefits to their 
employees. 
Businesses would receive a tax credit instead of a deduction for 
providing adoption assistance benefits. Under the current paradigm, 
businesses receive a deduction, the value of which is equal to 
reimbursement provided to the employee multiplied by the business’s tax 
rate. Thus, a business with a 20% marginal rate that provides $1,000 in 
adoption assistance benefits receives a $200 discount in tax liability. But if 
that same business received a credit instead of a deduction, the business’s 
tax liability would be reduced dollar for dollar according to the amount 
provided the employee in adoption benefits. Under such a plan, employees 
                                                                                                                           
Workplace. Wendy’s International, Inc. was rated the best adoption-friendly workplace in 
2008, providing $23,300 in financial reimbursement to its employees. See 
http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/Our-Work/Adoption-Friendly-Workplace/Best-
Adoption-Friendly-Workplaces-List-(1)/2009_BestAdoptionFriendlyWorkplaces. These 
employers still receive a deduction, but the employee must recognize income to the extent 
that benefits exceed the § 137 exclusion amount. See I.R.C. § 62  (2006) (defining adjusted 
gross income); id. § 162 (allowing business deductions); id. § 137 (allowing adoption credits 
for employees as a business deduction). Increasing the exclusion would reduce income tax 
consequences for the employees who work for these generous employers. 
 172. See infra Table 5.1.  
 173. See supra Part IV.   
 174. See supra Part V.B.  
 175. Information kits designed for this purpose are available free of charge through the 
Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption at http://www.davethomasfoundation.org/.  
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should retain the ability to exclude from income the adoption benefits. And 
as with any form of employee benefits, the business could not discriminate 
in favor of “highly compensated employees.”176   
A greater percentage of employers would almost certainly offer their 
employees adoption benefits if they received a credit instead of a deduction. 
This is because a business with positive tax liability would essentially be 
faced with two choices: pay the government a tax, or offer that money to 
employees in the form of adoption benefits.  
Understood in conjunction with the societal benefits of adoption,177 a 
new business tax credit represents cooperation by the government with 
private business to subsidize beneficial conduct. Through a new business 
tax credit, private business would effectively direct the use of what would 
otherwise be government funds to adoptive families. Although operation of 
this proposed credit is not as stark as if a business paid $1,000 to the 
government in taxes and instructed the government to write a $1,000 check 
to the employee on the business’s behalf, the final distribution of resources 
is the same as if the government were writing checks on behalf of adoptive 
families.178 Thus, the government has $1,000 less than it would without the 
credit, and the adoptive family has an additional $1,000.179   
The value of this proposed credit generally would be the same to the 
adoptive family as would a direct expenditure program that paid the 
adoptive family’s expenses.180 However, because the same level of benefits 
is provided for each adoption regardless of the adoptive family’s income, 
this proposed credit would likely have a greater total cost than the existing 
adoption credit.181 Other potential problems with this proposed credit 
include treatment of flow-thru entities. Additionally, non-profit or 
unprofitable businesses would not have the tax incentive that for-profit 
businesses would have to offer their employees adoption benefits. 
The upside of such a credit is that it fulfills political interests. Both of the 
major political parties express support for increased adoption programs,182 
                                                                                                                           
 176. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4). 
 177. See supra Part IV.A.   
 178. See generally Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 561 
(2008). 
 179. Id.  
 180. A 100% credit reduces tax liability dollar for dollar; thus, the amount of money the 
government has is identical, regardless of whether the taxpayer receives a credit or the 
government collects a tax but then distributes out the same amount in a subsidy.  
 181. Estimating the total cost is beyond the scope of this Comment.  
 182. See Samuels, supra note 39.  
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and both parties could understand the proposed credit as fostering a culture 
that values vulnerable children and works to create strong families. 
The proposed credit might also be understood as an apolitical attempt to 
reduce the number of abortions in our society.183 Judge Posner, for instance, 
has long advocated for the state to directly provide incentives to pregnant 
women to give their children up for adoption rather than to abort their 
children.184 By providing private business an incentive to offer adoption 
benefits, the proposed credit might contribute to attempts at creating a 
“culture of life” in our society, thus indirectly furthering Judge Posner’s 
proposition.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment has demonstrated the inequitable structure of the 
adoption tax credit. Under the existing paradigm, even families with income 
above the national median are not able to fully benefit from the adoption 
credit. This is contrasted with the exclusion-from-income provision, which 
is equitable across all income ranges. This Comment has explored some 
alternative methods of resolving this inequality, and ultimately has 
proposed a new business tax credit that results in a more equitable 
distribution of adoption benefits at all income levels and that furthers 
different political and social aims. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 183. The number of reported abortions was 1,220,000 in 2004, the most recent year for 
which reliable data is available. See Guttmacher Institute 2008 Study: Trends in 
Characteristics of Women Obtaining Abortions, 1974-2004, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2008/09/18/Report_Trends_Women_Obtaining_Abortions.
pdf. While abortion is a highly charged political issue, both parties have expressed support 
for decreasing the frequency of abortion. See REMARKS BY THE SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM 
CLINTON TO THE NYS FAMILY PLANNING PROVIDERS, Jan. 24, 2005, available at 
http://clinton.senate.gov/~clinton/speeches/2005125A05.html (outlining “a roadmap to the 
destination of fewer unwanted pregnancies -- to the day when abortion is truly safe, legal, 
and rare”) (emphasis added); see Samuels, supra note 39 (for Republican Platform).  
 184. Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 
63 (1987) (“Because of Roe v. Wade, the state cannot compel a woman determined to have 
an abortion to have the baby and give it up for adoption, but it does not follow that the 
woman should not be given incentives to do so.”).  
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TABLES 
TABLE 1185 
MINIMUM ANNUAL GROSS INCOME REQUIRED TO FULLY UTILIZE THE 
MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF THE ADOPTION TAX CREDIT FOR  
ONE ADOPTED CHILD 
(MARRIED COUPLE FILING JOINT TAX RETURN, 2007)186 
 
Situation $11,650 Adoption Credit 
 Used in One Year Used Over Six Years187 
No Other Children   
     No Child Care Credit  $101,250 $46,350 
     $600 Child Care Credit188 $103,650 $50,350 
One Other Child   
     No Child Care Credit $108,750 $56,500 
     $600 Child Care Credit $111,150 $60,500 
     $1,200 Child Care Credit $113,550 $64,500 
                                                                                                                           
 185. All Tables assume the taxpayer earns the same income across the time included in 
the analysis and that the standard deduction remains the same as the 2008 level. Because the 
standard deduction and adoption benefit changes each year, and the taxpayer’s income 
probably changes each year, it is not possible to arrive at exact figures over a five-year 
present value analysis. Nonetheless, the analysis reveals the general inequity of the adoption 
tax credit. Moreover, as this Comment has shown, the inequity inherent in the adoption tax 
credit is likely to be greater in five years time than it is currently.   
 186. Table 1 assumes taxpayers utilize the married filing jointly status, the standard 
deduction, the $1,000 per child tax credit, and the child and dependent care credit. Also, 
Table 1 assumes that no other credit is available. All numbers were factored according to the 
following method: the adoption credit ($11,650) was added to the amount of other credits 
($1,000 child tax credit + $3,000 child care credit [which results in a $600 credit] = $1,600), 
which equals $13,250. This is the amount of tax liability needed to fully use the adoption tax 
credit in one year. In 2008, the amount of taxable income needed to produce a $13,650 tax 
liability was $82,250. See I.R.S. PUBLICATION 678-W, 2008 TAX TABLE, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040tt.pdf. Add the standard deduction ($10,900 in 2008) 
and the exemptions ($3,500 per individual in 2008), which equals $21,400. This amount is 
added to the taxable income arrived at above. Thus, $82,250 + $21,400 = $103,650 is the 
needed gross income to fully utilize the adoption credit in one year. The same method, with 
appropriate credits added or excluded, was used to arrive at the other figures. 
 187. This means a taxpayer must have at least this amount of income in order to realize 
the full benefit of the adoption tax credit. Taxpayers with less income will not realize the full 
benefit of the credit due to insufficient tax liability.  
 188. This is the maximum credit allowed for $3,000 in expenses, the statutory limit. See 
I.R.S. FORM 2441, CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE EXPENSES FORM, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f2441.pdf.  
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TABLE 2 
INCOME NEEDED IN 2008 TO FULLY UTILIZE THE ADOPTION TAX CREDIT 
AND ECONOMIC LOSS THAT RESULTS IF TAXPAYER DOES NOT HAVE 
SUFFICIENT INCOME TO UTILIZE THE CREDIT189 
TABLE 2.1: BENEFIT FULLY UTILIZED IMMEDIATELY 
Income: 
$101,250190 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 11,650 0 1 11,650 0 
Year 1 0 - - 0 - 
Year 2 - - - - - 
Year 3 - - - - - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
                                                                                                                           
 189. Table 2 assumes taxpayers utilize the married filing jointly status, the standard 
deduction, and the $1,000 per child tax credit, but not the child care credit. Present Value of 
Credit is determined by multiplying the amount of the Adoption Credit Utilized by the 
Remainder Factor, which is determined at a 6% rate, according to I.R.S. PUBLICATION 1457, 
Table B, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1457.pdf. Economic Loss per Year is 
determined by subtracting the Present Value of Credit from the Adoption Credit Utilized.  
 190. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 1 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $11,650. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $12,650. In 2008, taxable income of $79,850 is needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), 
which equals $101,250 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in one year. 
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TABLE 2.2: BENEFIT FULLY UTILIZED BY YEAR 1 
Income: 
72,250191 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of  
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 5,825 5,825 1 5,825.00 0 
Year 1 5,825 0 .94 5,475.50 349.50 
Year 2 0 - - 0 - 
Year 3 - - - - - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
11,300.50 
 
349.50 
 
TABLE 2.3: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 2 
Income: 
59,300192 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 3,883.33 7,766.67 1 3,883.33 0 
Year 1 3,883.33 3,883.33 .94 3,650.33 233.00 
Year 2 3,883.33 0 .89 3,456.16 427.18 
Year 3 0 - - 0 - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,989.82 
 
660.18 
 
                                                                                                                           
 191. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 2 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $5,825. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $6,825. In 2008, taxable income of $50,850 is needed to produce that much tax 
liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), which 
equals $72,250 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in two years.  
 192. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 3 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $3,883.33. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $4,883.33. In 2008, taxable income of $37,900 is needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), 
which equals $59,300 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in three years. 
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TABLE 2.4: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 3 
Income: 
52,850193 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 2,912.50 8,737.50 1 2,912.50 0 
Year 1 2,912.50 5,825.00 .94 2,737.75 174.75 
Year 2 2,912.50 2,912.50 .89 2,592.13 320.37 
Year 3 2,912.50 0 .84 2,446.50 466.00 
Year 4 0 - - 0 - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,688.88 
 
961.12 
 
TABLE 2.5: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 4 
Income: 
48,850194 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 2,330 9,320 1 2,330.00 0 
Year 1 2,330 6,990 .94 2,190.20 139.80 
Year 2 2,330 4,660 .89 2,073.70 256.30 
Year 3 2,330 2330 .84 1,957.20 372.80 
Year 4 2,330 0 .79 1,840.70 489.00 
Year 5 0 - - 0 - 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,427.80 
 
1,258.20 
 
                                                                                                                           
 193. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 4 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $2,912.50. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $3,912.50. In 2008, taxable income of $31,450 is needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), 
which equals $52,850 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in four years. 
 194. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 5 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $2,330. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $3,330. In 2008, taxable income of $27,550 is needed to produce that much tax 
liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), which 
equals $48,950 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in five years. 
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TABLE 2.6: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 5 
Income: 
46,350195 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 1,941.67 9,708.35 1 1,941.67 0 
Year 1 1,941.67 7,766.69 .94 1,474.67 116.50 
Year 2 1,941.67 5,825.02 .89 1,592.17 213.58 
Year 3 1,941.67 3,883.37 .84 1,708.67 310.67 
Year 4 1,941.67 1,941.67 .79 1,825.17 408.00 
Year 5 1,941.67 0 .75 1,941.67 485.42 
 
Total 
 
11,650 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,116.10 
 
1,533.92 
 
SUMMARY OF TABLE 2 
Income Years Necessary to Fully 
Realize Benefit of 
Adoption Tax Credit 
 
Actual Economic 
Benefit of the Credit 
(present value of the 
credit) 
$101,250 – phase-out 
amount 
Zero 11,650.00 
$101,249 - $72,250 One 11,300.50 
$72,249 - $59,300 Two 10,951.00 
$59,299 - $52,850 Three 10,683.88 
$52,849 - $48,850 Four 10,427.80 
$48,849 - $46,350 Five 10,116.10 
$46,349 or less Benefit not fully utilized < $10,000 
 
                                                                                                                           
 195. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $11,650 by 6 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $1,941.67. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $2,941.67. In 2008, taxable income of $24,950 is needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($10,500) and standard deduction ($10,900), 
which equals $46,350 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in six years. 
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TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF VALUE OF ADOPTION CREDIT AND EXCLUSION AT 
VARIOUS INCOME LEVELS, 2008 
Income Value of § 23 Credit Value of § 137 
Exclusion 
$101,250 – phase-out 
amount 
11,650.00 11,650 
$101,249 - $72,250 11,300.50 11,650 
$72,249 - $59,300 10,951.00 11,650 
$59,299 - $52,850 10,683.88 11,650 
$52,849 - $48,850 10,427.80 11,650 
$48,849 - $46,350 10,116.10 11,650 
$46,349 or less < $10,000 11,650 
 
TABLE 4 
RETURNS CLAIMING THE § 23 ADOPTION TAX CREDIT, 1997 – 2006196 
 
           
 Total 
returns 
Amount $0- 
15,000 
$15,000-
30,000 
$30,000-
40,000 
$40,000-
50,000 
$50,000-
75,000 
$75,000-
100,000 
$100,000-
200,000 
$200,000+ 
1999 30,721 58,522 3,161 6,264 - 5,373 14,463 508 951 -  
1998 40,668 83,046 - 4,936 6,969 7,884 11,896 7,108 1,879 3
1999 47,349 103,016 - 2,924 2,981 7,780 20,653 6,133 6,729 151
2000 42,881 91,888 - 1,898 1,911 7,932 17,142 11,060 2,729 8
2001 47,737 88,781 1,978 2,013 3,305 3,892 15,413 17,869 3,112 156
2002197 66,906 234,109 - 2,010 2,043 4,992 19,216 15,247 12,386 11
2003 63,980 348,793 - 948 5,207 3,856 17,654 17,501 18,797 17
2004 71,136 301,890 - 974 6,947 3,739 19,969 23,706 15,477 324
2005 84,793 319,558 - 3,310 7,829 10,423 26,465 17,525 18,684 546
2006 93,369 351,184  2,395 11,922 18,967 98,193 64,195 150,208 5,248
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 196. This Table was compiled from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 
Complete Year Bulletins, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/ 
0,,id=133414,00.html#_complete (under Table 2, select the link for the appropriate year, 
which opens an Excel Document). Monetary amounts are in thousands of dollars.  
 197. This is the first year the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(EGTRA) applied. EGTRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified in scattered 
sections of the I.R.C.).  
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TABLE 5 
TAX RETURNS UNDER THE EXISTING ADOPTION BENEFIT SYSTEM198 
TABLE 5.1: TREASURY DEPARTMENT DATA 
Year Number of 
Returns 
with 
Adoption 
Expenses 
Total Tax 
Benefit of 
Adoption 
Provisions 
(in thou-
sands of 
dollars) 
Current 
Year 
Credit 
Allowance 
(foregone 
revenue) 
Current 
Year 
Exclusion 
Allowance 
(foregone 
revenue) 
% 
Change 
From 
Previous 
Year in 
Total 
Benefits 
Allowed 
Exclusion 
Benefits 
as % of 
Whole 
1997 [information 
not 
available] 
     
1998 [information 
not 
available] 
     
1999 45,759 107,997 103,139 4,858 - 4.5 
2000 43,902 109,299 106,440 2,859 1.2 2.6 
2001 43,614 108,979 105,468 3,511 (.01) 3.3 
2002 54,592 245,965 240,636 5,329 56 2.2 
2003 57,230 282,561 277,089 5,472 28 1.9 
2004 59,664 341,625 335,346 6,279 17 1.8 
2005 56,423 361,527 355,319 6,208 5.8 1.7 
 
                                                                                                                           
 198. This Table is compiled from data in DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 71.  
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TABLE 5.2: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA199  
NON-TAXABLE RETURNS 
 Total 
Returns 
Claiming 
Adoption 
Credit 
Non-
Taxable 
Returns 
Amount of 
Credit 
Claimed 
Amount 
Claimed on 
Non-
Taxable 
Returns 
% Amount 
Claimed 
on Non-
Taxable 
Returns 
1997 30,721 11,688 58,522 32,703 56% 
1998 40,668 16,809 83,046 42,772 52% 
1999 47,349 10,787 103,016 27,582 27% 
2000 42,881 18,933 91,866 55,272 60% 
2001 47,737 13,576 88,781 20,020 23% 
2002 66,906 22,206 234,109 107,872 46% 
2003 63,980 30,924 348,793 179,376 51% 
2004 71,136 39,344 301,890 158,616 53% 
2005 84,793 52,664 319,558 195,303 61% 
2006 93,369  351,184   
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 199. This Table was compiled from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 
Complete Year Bulletins, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/ 
0,,id=133414,00.html#_complete (under Table 2, select the link for the appropriate year, 
which opens an Excel Document).  
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TABLE 6 
INCOME NEEDED IN 2005 TO FULLY UTILIZE THE ADOPTION TAX CREDIT 
AND ECONOMIC LOSS THAT RESULTS IF TAXPAYER DOES NOT HAVE 
SUFFICIENT INCOME TO UTILIZE THE CREDIT200 
TABLE 6.1: BENEFIT FULLY UTILIZED IMMEDIATELY 
Income: 
$92,800201 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 10,630 0 1 10,630 0 
Year 1 0 - - 0 - 
Year 2 - - - - - 
Year 3 - - - - - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
                                                                                                                           
 200. Table 6 assumes taxpayers utilize the married filing jointly status, the standard 
deduction, and the $1,000 per child tax credit, but not the child care credit. Present Value of 
Credit is determined by multiplying the amount of the Adoption Credit Utilized by the 
Remainder Factor, which is determined at a 6% rate, according to I.R.S. PUBLICATION 1457, 
Table B, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1457.pdf. Economic Loss per Year is 
determined by subtracting the Present Value of Credit from the Adoption Credit Utilized.  
 201. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 1 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $10,630. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $11,630. In 2005, taxable income of $73,200 was needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $92,800 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in one year. 
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TABLE 6.2: BENEFIT FULLY UTILIZED BY YEAR 1 
Income: 
$66,600202 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of  
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 5,315 5,315 1 5,315.00 0 
Year 1 5,315 0 .94 4,996.10 318.90 
Year 2 0 - - 0 - 
Year 3 - - - - - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,311.10 
 
318.90 
TABLE 6.3: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 2 
Income: 
54,750203 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 3,543.33 7,086.67 1 3,543.33 0 
Year 1 3,543.33 3,543.33 .94 3,330.73 212.60 
Year 2 3,543.33 0 .89 3,153.56 389.77 
Year 3 0 - - 0 - 
Year 4 - - - - - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
10,027.62 
 
602.37 
 
                                                                                                                           
 202. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 2 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $5,315. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $6,315. In 2005, taxable income of $47,000 was needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $66,600 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in two years. 
 203. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 3 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $3,543.33. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $4,434.33. In 2005, taxable income of $35,150 was needed to produce that 
much tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $54,750 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in three years. 
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TABLE 6.4: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 3 
Income: 
48,850204 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 2,657.50 7,972.50 1 2,657.50 0 
Year 1 2,657.50 5,315.50 .94 2,498.05 174.75 
Year 2 2,657.50 2,657.50 .89 2,365.18 320.37 
Year 3 2,657.50 0 .84 2,232.30 466.00 
Year 4 0 - - 0 - 
Year 5 - - - - - 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
9,753.03 
 
876.98 
 
TABLE 6.5: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 4 
Income: 
45,300205 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 2,126 8,504 1 2,126.00 0 
Year 1 2,126 6,378 .94 1,998.44 139.80 
Year 2 2,126 4,252 .89 1,892.14 256.30 
Year 3 2,126 2,126 .84 1,785.84 372.80 
Year 4 2,126 0 .79 1,679.54 489.00 
Year 5 0 - - 0 - 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
9,517.96 
 
1,148.04 
 
                                                                                                                           
 204. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 4 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $2,657.50. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $3,657.50. In 2005, taxable income of $29,250 was needed to produce that 
much tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $48,850 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in four years. 
 205. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 5 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $2,126. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $3,126. In 2005, taxable income of $25,700 was needed to produce that much 
tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $45,300 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in five years. 
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TABLE 6.6: BENEFIT FULLY REALIZED BY YEAR 5 
Income: 
43,100206 
Adoption 
Credit 
Utilized 
Outstanding 
QAE 
Remainder 
Factor 
Present 
Value of 
Credit 
Economic 
Loss per 
Year 
Year 0 1,771.67 8,858.33 1 1,771.67 0 
Year 1 1,771.67 7,086.67 .94 1,665.37 106.30 
Year 2 1,771.67 5,315.00 .89 1,576.79 194.88 
Year 3 1,771.67 3,543.33 .84 1,488.20 283.47 
Year 4 1,771.67 1771.67 .79 1,399.62 372.00 
Year 5 1,771.67 0 .75 1,328.75 442.92 
 
Total 
 
10,630 
 
0 
 
- 
 
9,230.40 
 
1,399.62 
 
SUMMARY OF TABLE 6 
 
Income Years Needed to Fully 
Utilize Adoption Tax 
Credit 
Actual Economic Benefit 
of the Credit (PV of 
Credit) 
$92,800 - phase-out 
amount 
Zero 10,630.00 
$92,799 - $66,600 One 10,311.10 
$66,599 - $54,750 Two 10,027.62 
$54,749 - $48,850 Three 9,753.03 
$48,849 - $45,300 Four 9,517.96 
$45,299 - $43,100 Five 9,230.40 
$43,099 or less Benefit not fully utilized <   9,230.00 
 
                                                                                                                           
 206. This number was arrived at in the following manner. First, divide $10,630 by 6 (the 
number of years to fully utilize the credit), which equals $1,771.67. That is the amount of tax 
liability needed to cover the adoption credit. To that figure, add $1,000 child tax credit, 
which equals $2,771.67. In 2005, taxable income of $23,500 was needed to produce that 
much tax liability. Add to that figure exemptions ($9,600) and standard deduction ($10,000), 
which equals $43,100 in gross income needed to utilize the adoption credit in six years. 
